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A model in which a high-productivity region and a low-productivity re-
gion bargain with each ￿rm in a group of mobile ￿rms is constructed. It
di⁄ers from the Han and Leach [7] model in that the ￿rms are identical, so
that its comparative statics are more tractable. The model is used to ex-
amine the allocative e⁄ects of equalization payments (both non-contingent
payments and ￿corrective subsidies￿ ). The equilibrium is characterized by
misallocation of capital and underprovision of public goods. Underprovi-
sion is more severe in the low-productivity region than the high-productivity
region. A transfer of revenue from the high-productivity region to the low-
productivity region augments public goods provision in the low-productivity
region, allowing that region to make more generous o⁄ers to the ￿rms. Like-
wise, underprovsion becomes more severe in the high-productivity region, so
that its o⁄ers become less generous. Equilibrium is attained by a movement
of ￿rms from the high-productivity region to the low-productivity region,
reducing the misallocation of capital.
￿I am indebted to Seungjin Han for valuable discussions.
11. Introduction
A mobile ￿rm￿ s location decision is in￿ uenced by the rates at which its pro￿ts
would be taxed in the various locations open to it. The resource and welfare
implications of the strategic setting of these tax rates by competing governments
has been extensively studied (see Wilson [11] for a survey of the literature). How-
ever, the ￿rm￿ s location decision is also in￿ uenced by other ￿nancial incentives,
such as tax holidays and infrastructure grants.1 Since these incentives can be
tailored to individual ￿rms while tax rates cannot, they are likely to have quite
di⁄erent e⁄ects on resource allocation. The literature on ￿nancial incentives is
small, and almost all of it employs a partial equilibrium framework. Tax holidays
have received the most attention. A number of earlier papers have o⁄ered expla-
nations of the tax breaks given to mobile ￿rms, but these papers have described
the negotiations between a single ￿rm and one or two governments. Doyle and
van Wijnbergen [6] examine the intertemporal structure of a ￿rm￿ s tax payments.
They note that a mobile ￿rm has greater bargaining power than a ￿rm that has
already incurred the sunk costs associated with locating in a particular region.
They argue that mobile ￿rms will use their extra bargaining power to extract
concessions. Bond and Samuelson [3] present an alternative explanation of the
same phenomenon: a region can o⁄er a tax holiday to a mobile ￿rm to signal that
￿rms that locate there experience high productivity. The ￿rm will willingly pay
higher tax rates in later periods because it is very productive, and these high tax
rates allow the government to recover the cost of the initial tax holiday. A low-
productivity region could not o⁄er the same incentive: ￿rms that located there
would relocate when they found that they had low productivity, so the region
would be unable to recover the cost of the tax holiday. King, McAfee and Welling
[8] extend this model by allowing the ￿rm to negotiate simultaneously with two
governments, and add a stochastic element to the regional productivities. Black
and Hoyt [1] take an altogether di⁄erent approach, arguing that subsidies to mo-
bile ￿rms can undo the distortionary e⁄ects of average cost pricing of publicly
provided services.
These models have partial equilibrium structures, so they cannot describe
the impact of ￿nancial incentives on resource allocation and welfare. A general
equilibrium model is required for this purpose. Seungjin Han and I [7] have
1As one example of the importance of ￿nancial incentives, Ford is currently (January 2008)
seeking $60 million from the Ontario and Canadian governments to assist it in reopening an
engine plant. The cost of re￿tting the plant is approximately $300 million.proposed one such model, and I am aware of no others. Our model assumes
that the government of each region makes ￿rm-speci￿c o⁄ers to every ￿rm, and
that each ￿rm chooses to locate in the region in which its after-tax pro￿ts are
maximized. We show that the equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal if the
government is also able to impose a lump-sum tax on its citizens (as is commonly
assumed in the ￿xed-rate tax competition literature), but that misallocation of
capital and underprovision of the public good are possible￿ though not certain￿ if
the government cannot impose such a tax. The assumption that the government
is willing to ￿cut a deal￿with every ￿rm is somewhat unrealistic, but we would
argue that the standard tax competition model (which assumes that there are
no deals for any ￿rm) is also unrealistic. Our model and the ￿xed-rate model
constitute polar cases, with reality somewhere in between.
Our model assumes that each ￿rm￿ s productivity varies from region to region,
and that the pro￿le of regional productivities varies from ￿rm to ￿rm. The het-
erogeneity of the ￿rms plays a crucial role in establishing the equilibrium, so the
distribution of these pro￿les must be non-degenerate. Unfortunately, the resulting
model is su¢ ciently complex that its comparative statics can be intractable.
The current paper presents a more tractable version of the Han and Leach
[7] model. The greater tractability is obtained by assuming that the ￿rms are
homogeneous. Following Boadway and Flatters [2], the model assumes that there
are two regions, and that all ￿rms have high productivity in one region and low
productivity in the other. Wilson￿ s [11] assumption that there is only one tax,
the pro￿ts tax, is imposed. The equilibrium is characterized by misallocation of
capital (too many ￿rms locate in the high productivity region) and underprovision
of public goods. Although each region underprovides the public good, the degree
of underprovision is more severe in the low productivity region. These two results
are related. As the underprovision of public goods becomes more severe, the share
of gross pro￿ts taken by the government becomes larger. Equilibrium requires the
￿rms to be indi⁄erent between the regions; equivalently, it requires that each
￿rm￿ s after-tax pro￿ts are the same in both regions. This condition is met only
if gross pro￿ts are bigger in the region in which the government takes the larger
share of gross pro￿ts. Hence, gross pro￿ts must be lower in the high productivity
region than in the low productivity region, signalling a misallocation of capital.
The new model is applied to the issue of equalization payments. The rela-
tionship between equalization payments and tax competition has been extensively
studied in the context of the standard tax competition model, notably by Kothen-
burger [9] and by Bucovetsky and Smart [4]. The intent of the current paper isto discover whether the bene￿cial properties of these systems carry over to the
bargaining model. Equalization payments are modelled as a transfer (instituted
by some higher authority) of tax revenue from the low productivity region to the
high productivity region. The channel through which equalization payments op-
erate is clear: they reduce the severity of underprovision in the low productivity
region and raise it in the high productivity region, diminishing the gap between
the shares of gross pro￿ts taken by the two governments. The gap between gross
pro￿ts of ￿rms in the two regions is likewise diminished, indicating a smaller de-
gree of resource misallocation. While these e⁄ects serve to reduce misallocation,
non-contingent equalization payments cannot induce a Pareto optimal allocation.
That is, there is misallocation of capital and underprovision of public goods even
in the presence of a non-contingent equalization payment. It is sometimes, but
not always, possible to reach a Pareto optimal allocation through ￿corrective sub-
sidies￿of the sort described by Wildasin [10] and DePater and Myers [5]. These
subsidies sometimes fail because there is a de￿nite upper limit on the amount
of revenue that they can raise; if preferences for the public good are su¢ ciently
strong, they cannot raise enough revenue to provide the requisite public goods.
2. Production and Welfare
The economy consists of two regions, denoted H and L, and each region is popu-
lated by a continuum of identical agents. The agents in each region have measure
1, and each agent inelastically o⁄ers one unit of labour. There is also a continuum
of identical ￿rms. The continuum has measure 1 and the ￿rms are indexed by
the numbers on the unit interval. The ￿rms locate in one of the two regions, and
produce a homogeneous good using the labour available in that region.
Let ￿i (i = H;L) be the set of ￿rms that locate in region i, and let si be its
measure. Let the map n : [0;1] ! R+ specify the quantity of labour employed by
each ￿rm. The output of ￿rm j located in region i is
yi(j) = ￿in(j)
￿ 0 < ￿ < 1
Here, ￿i is a regional productivity factor. Region H is the high productivity region
and region L is the low productivity region:
￿H = 1
￿L = ￿ 0 < ￿ < 1














for all j 2 ￿i (2)
and region i￿ s aggregate output is
Yi = ￿i(si)
1￿￿ (3)
One unit of output can be converted into either one unit of private goods or one
unit of public goods, so the economy￿ s production possibility frontier is
YL + YH ￿ cL + cH + gL + gH (4)
where ci and gi are region i￿ s consumption of the private and public goods respec-
tively.
Since the agents in each region are identical and have measure one, each agent￿ s
consumption bundle is (ci;gi): Each agent￿ s utility is a strictly increasing function
of his consumption:
Ui = u(ci;gi)
It is assumed that u is strictly concave and class C2. It is also assumed that both
goods are normal, and that the income elasticity of demand for the public good





The assumptions on income elasticities imply that2
MRS(ci;gi) > MRS(aci;bgi) if b > 1 and b > a (5)
An allocation in this economy is a collection (￿L;￿H;n;cL;cH;gL;gH): An
allocation is feasible if
2Draw the income expansion paths in the (ci;gi) plane. Then (bci;bgi) does not lie on a lower
expansion path than (ci;gi), and (aci;bgi) lies on a higher expansion path than (bci;bgi):
51. It satis￿es (1) and (4), so that total consumption is no greater than total
production.
2. Every ￿rm locates in one of the two regions:
￿L \ ￿H = ?
￿L [ ￿H = [0;1]
3. The ￿rms in each region use only the labour available within the region:
Z
￿i
n(j)dj ￿ 1 i = H;L
Note that this de￿nition of feasibility assumes that goods produced in one region
can be consumed in either region.
3. Pareto Optimality
An allocation is Pareto optimal if there is no other allocation under which utility
is higher in at least one region and lower in neither region. Since the production
possibility frontier allows goods produced in each region to be consumed in either
region, the conditions for Pareto optimality can be broken into two parts: the
maximization of output, and the allocation of output.
Suppose that the ￿rms have been divided between the two regions in some
fashion. Since the ￿rms are identical, and since the marginal product of labour is
diminishing, output is maximized only if every ￿rm in a region employs the same
quantity of labour. As well, no labour can be left idle. These conditions imply
that the allocation of labour across ￿rms satis￿es (2). Total output is then
Y ￿ YH + YL = ￿H(sH)
1￿￿ + ￿L(sL)
1￿￿
Output is maximized if moving an arbitrarily small measure of ￿rms from one




Any feasible (￿L;￿H;n) that satis￿es (2) and (6) maximizes total output.
6Now suppose that output has been maximized. Since utility is strictly increas-
ing in consumption of the two goods, every unit of output must be allocated to
one of the two regions:
YL + YH = cL + cH + gL + gH (7)
Given the output available to region i, each agent￿ s utility is maximized if
u1(ci;gi) = u2(ci;gi) (8)
If (cH;cL;gH;gL) satis￿es (7) and (8) for both i, any reallocation of output reduces
utility in at least one region.
An allocation is Pareto optimal if and only if it satis￿es the output maximiza-
tion conditions (2) and (6) and the output allocation conditions (7) and (8).
4. Tax Competition
This section sets out a variant of the Han and Leach [7] bargaining model of tax
competition.3 Each region￿ s public good is provided by its government, which has
three ￿scal instruments at its disposal. It can o⁄er ￿nancial incentives to speci￿c
￿rms to induce them to locate within the region, and it can tax the pro￿ts of the
￿rms that choose to locate there. Since the government taxes pro￿ts at a ￿xed rate
but is able to o⁄er ￿nancial incentives that vary from ￿rm to ￿rm, identical ￿rms
in the same region do not necessarily have the same net pro￿ts. The last ￿scal
instrument is a non-negative lump-sum transfer to the citizens, enabling them to
augment their private consumption.4 The government￿ s tax revenue must equal its
expenditures, which are the sum of the ￿nancial incentives, the lump-sum transfer
and spending on the public good.
The model is a two stage game. In the ￿rst stage, each government makes an
o⁄er to each ￿rm, and each ￿rm chooses to locate in the region (or one of the
regions) in which its net pro￿ts is maximized. In the second stage, the ￿rms hire
labour in competitive regional markets, produce goods, receive ￿nancial incentives
and pay taxes, and return their net pro￿ts to their owners. The ownership of each
3A key element of that model was heterogeneity across ￿rms. An interesting aspect of the
current model is that it generates many of the same results without assuming any kind of
heterogeneity.
4The non-negativity of the transfer implies that there is no lump-sum tax in the economy. It
will be shown below that the optimal transfer is zero.
7￿rm is equally divided among all of the agents, so both regions receive an equal
share of net pro￿ts. Each government chooses the division of its revenue between
public goods provision and the lump-sum transfer. The ￿rms and the governments
correctly anticipate the outcome of the second stage when they make their choices
in the ￿rst stage.
A government￿ s o⁄er to a ￿rm states the maximal net pro￿ts that the ￿rm
would earn if it located within the region. These pro￿ts are de￿ned as the net
pro￿ts earned when the ￿rm hires the optimal quantity of labour at the compet-
itive wage rate. A government can make such o⁄ers because it knows the other
government￿ s o⁄ers, and therefore can anticipate the market-clearing wage and
the division of labour across ￿rms. Each ￿rm locates in the region in which its
maximal net pro￿ts are higher; if both regions o⁄er the same maximal net pro￿ts,
the ￿rm is willing to locate in either region. Each government, taking the o⁄ers
of the other government as given and correctly anticipating the outcome of the
second stage, chooses the o⁄ers that maximize the utility of the region￿ s citizens.
Let ￿i : [0;1] ! R+ be the maximal net pro￿ts o⁄ered to each ￿rm by the
government of region i: The outcome of the game is described by a pro￿le (￿H;￿L)
and an allocation (￿L;￿H;n;cL;cH;gL;gH):
Consider the second stage ￿rst. The ￿rms in each region are identical and hire
labour at the market-clearing wage rate, so each ￿rm hires the same quantity of
labour. Aggregate output in region i is (3). Government revenue, de￿ned as tax
revenue less ￿nancial incentives, is equal to the di⁄erence between gross pro￿ts
and maximal net pro￿ts.
Ri = (1 ￿ ￿)￿i(si)
1￿￿ ￿
R
￿i￿i(j)dj i = H;L (9)
The total income of the region￿ s citizens is the sum of their wage earnings (which










i = H;L (10)




Ui = u(Xi + t;Ri ￿ t)
Its solution is described by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
t ￿ 0
8u1(ci;gi) ￿ u2(ci;gi) (11)
t[u1(ci;gi) ￿ u2(ci;gi)] = 0
Public goods are optimally provided in region i if
u1(ci;gi) = u2(ci;gi)
and they are underprovided if
u1(ci;gi) < u2(ci;gi)
Clearly, optimal provision occurs only when government revenue Ri is a su¢ ciently
large part of total resources Xi + Ri:
Now consider the ￿rst stage. Let ￿i denote the region that is not i, and de￿ne
the sets
￿i(￿H;￿L) = fj 2 [0;1] : ￿i(j) > ￿￿i(j)g
￿i(￿H;￿L) = fj 2 [0;1] : ￿i(j) ￿ ￿￿i(j)g
That is, ￿i and ￿i are the smallest and largest sets of ￿rms that could locate in
region i under any pro￿le (￿H;￿L): The sets ￿H and ￿L are consistent with net
pro￿t maximization￿ henceforth, consistent￿ if they are feasible and satisfy the
condition
￿i(￿H;￿L) ￿ ￿i ￿ ￿i(￿H;￿L) i = H;L
The choices made by the governments and ￿rms in the ￿rst stage can now be more
formally described.
De￿nition 1. Assume that each region anticipates that government revenue and
total income will be given by (9) and (10), and that it will choose the optimal
transfer in the second stage. An equilibrium includes a pro￿le (￿H;￿L) and a
consistent division of the ￿rms (￿H;￿L) such that:
1. There is no alternative pro￿le (￿0
H;￿L), and no alternative division of the
￿rms (￿0
H;￿0
L) that is consistent under this pro￿le, such that UH is higher.
2. There is no alternative pro￿le (￿H;￿0
L), and no alternative division of the
￿rms (￿0
H;￿0
L) that is consistent under this pro￿le, such that UL is higher.
An equilibrium pro￿le has the following properties.
9Lemma 2. Let (￿H;￿L) be an equilibrium pro￿le. Then, for each region i,
1. The set fj 2 [0;1] : ￿i(j) > ￿￿i(j)g has measure zero.
2. There is no positive number ki such that the sets fj 2 ￿i : ￿i(j) > kig and
fj 2 ￿￿i : ￿i(j) < kig both have positive measure.
These properties imply that, in equilibrium, each region makes the same o⁄er
￿ to almost every ￿rm. Every ￿rm is indi⁄erent between the two regions, and
consistency requires only that every ￿rm ends up in one of the two regions:
sH + sL = 1 (12)
A triplet (￿;sH;sL) that corresponds to an equilibrium has the following property.
Lemma 3. Assume that each government anticipates that government revenue
and total income will be given by (9) and (10), and that it will choose the optimal
transfer in the second stage. Let (￿H;￿L) be a pro￿le satisfying
￿H(j) = ￿L(j) = ￿ for all j 2 [0;1]
Let (￿H;￿L) be a consistent division of the ￿rms, and let (sH;sL) be the measures
of these sets. The pro￿le and the division of the ￿rms constitute an equilibrium
outcome of the ￿rst stage of the tax competition game if and only if there is no
alternative pair (s0
H;s0
L) satisfying (12) such that at least one of the regions attains
higher utility.
That is, if each region makes the same o⁄er ￿ to every ￿rm, and if there is no
redistribution of the ￿rms that raises utility in either region, neither region has a
utility-improving deviation of any kind. Moreover, if there is some reallocation of
the ￿rms that would raise some region￿ s utility under the current o⁄er pro￿le, that
region can engineer a utility-improving redistribution of the ￿rms by unilaterally
adjusting its o⁄ers.
Given this result, an equilibrium triplet (￿;sH;sL) is easy to ￿nd. It has the
property that each region i is content with the fraction si of the ￿rms when the
common o⁄er is ￿.
Since every ￿rm in region i receives the same o⁄er and employs the same
quantity of labour, total income and government revenue in region i are





10b R(si;￿;￿i) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿i(si)
1￿￿ ￿ si￿ (14)
The functions b X and b R are class C2 and concave in si: Since u has the same
properties, the maximum value function
V (si;￿;￿i) ￿ max
t￿0
u( b X(si;￿;￿i) + t; b R(si;￿;￿i) ￿ t)
is also class C2 and concave in si: Consequently, if each region￿ s optimal share of
the ￿rms is in the interior of the interval [0;1], it is a stationary point:
V1(si;￿;￿i) = 0 i = H;L (15)
The concavity of V implies that the stationary point￿ if it exists￿ is unique.
Lemma 4. In any equilibrium:
1. Some ￿rms are located in each region.
2. Public goods are underprovided and the lump-sum transfer is 0 in both
regions.
Since the ￿rst stage equilibrium is not a corner solution, it is a triplet (sH;sL;￿)
satisfying (12) and (15). The continuity of Vi implies that the optimal value of si
(call it s￿
i) is a continuous function of ￿ and ￿i: The derivatives of this function
are determined by the signs of V12 and V13 respectively. When evaluating these
derivatives, the marginal rate of substitution can be represented by the composite
function
￿(si;￿;￿i) ￿ MRS( b X(si;￿;￿i); b R(si;￿;￿i))
because, by Lemma 4, the optimal transfer is zero.











V11 is negative (because V is concave in si), so the sign of this expression is
the same as the sign of V12 evaluated at s￿
i(￿): Di⁄erentiating the equation
V1(si;￿;￿i) = u1
h




















An increase in ￿ increases b X and reduces b R, so ￿2 is positive. Furthermore,
(15) implies ￿












It follows that V12, evaluated at s￿

























The derivatives b X13 and b R13 are both positive, and b R1 is again negative. An
increase in ￿i raises Xi by a smaller proportion than it raises Ri, so ￿3 is





These results allow Figure 1 to be drawn. The intersection of the two curves
determines the equilibrium values of sH and ￿, and the equilibrium value of sL
is 1 ￿ sH. The more productive region obtains more than half of the ￿rms. The
characteristics of the equilibrium are described by (16). Although each region
gives up government revenue to attract the marginal ￿rm, that ￿rm raises the
wage earnings of the region￿ s citizens. Total wages are equal to the fraction ￿
of total output. Since region H has both the higher productivity factor and the
greater number of ￿rms, it has the higher wage rate. Net pro￿ts are equally divided
between the two regions, so region H also has the higher per capita income.
12Figure 1: The equilibrium is (b sH;1￿b sH;b ￿): More than half of the ￿rms locate in
the high productivity region.
The equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. Conditions (2) and (7) are satis￿ed,
but (6) and (8) are violated. The violation of (8) has already been demonstrated;
and the following lemma deals with the violation of (6) and its consequences.
Proposition 5. In equilibrium,







2. The marginal rate of substitution is higher in the low productivity region
than in the high productivity region:
￿(sL;￿) > ￿(sH;￿) > 1
3. Consumption of both goods is greater in the high productivity region than
in the low productivity region.








+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(17)
The net pro￿ts of a ￿rm in region i are ￿ while its gross pro￿ts are dYi=dsi.5;6
If region i is somehow able to provide the optimal quantity of public goods (so
that ￿(si;￿) is equal to 1), it allows the ￿rm to retain all of the gross pro￿ts. As
its ability to provide these goods declines (i.e, ￿i rises), the region becomes less
generous, with the ￿rm retaining a progressively smaller share of gross pro￿ts. In
the equilibrium, the regions allow the same net pro￿ts, but for di⁄erent reasons.
A ￿rm in region H is relatively unproductive; but the region contains the bulk of
the ￿rms so it is able to provide a relatively large quantity of public goods and
hence allows the ￿rm to retain a relatively large fraction of relatively small gross
pro￿ts. The opposite situation prevails in region L: the ￿rms receive a relatively
small fraction of relatively large gross pro￿ts.
In summary, these are the properties of equilibrium:
1. Almost every ￿rm receives an o⁄er of b ￿ from both regions.
2. Any division of the ￿rms between the regions is consistent with equilibrium
as long as the measures of the ￿rms going to regions H and L are b sH and
1 ￿ b sH respectively. There are more ￿rms in the high productivity region
than in the low productivity region.
3. Every ￿rm in region i (i = H;L) employs the same quantity of labour.
4. All of Xi is spent on the consumption good and all of Ri is spent on public
goods. Consumption of both goods is greater in the high productivity region
than in the low productivity region.
5The output of an individual ￿rm in region i is ￿i(si)￿￿: The ￿rm￿ s gross pro￿ts are the
fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of its output, which is also dYi=dsi:
6In the bargaining model with heterogeneous ￿rms, the equilibrium is Pareto optimal if the
governments have access to a lump-sum tax. The same result occurs here. Each government
would use the lump-sum tax to optimally provide public goods, so the marginal rate of substi-
tution would be the same in each region. Then (17) implies that dYi=dsi is the same in each
region, so that output is maximized. If the government has access to both a pro￿ts tax and
a lump-sum tax, the pro￿ts tax would raise no revenue when the ￿rms are homogeneous but
would raise positive revenue when the ￿rms are heterogeneous.
145. Public goods are underprovided. The marginal rate of substitution is higher
in the low productivity region than in the high productivity region.
5. Equalization Payments
Equalization payments in Canada are intended to ensure that every region is
able to provide an adequate quantity of public goods. They are modelled here
as a transfer of government revenue across regions, engineered by some central
authority whose behaviour is exogenous. Assume that region i receives a transfer
￿i: Its revenue is no longer given by (14); instead, it is
b R(si;￿;￿i;￿i) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿i(si)
1￿￿ ￿ si￿ + ￿i (18)
Since the central authority is not invested with any additional taxing powers, the
sum of the transfers must be zero. Region L provides the smaller quantity of
public goods and has the larger marginal rate of substitution, so it will be taken
to be the recipient of a positive transfer:
￿L = ￿￿H > 0
It is, of course, possible to give region L such a large transfer that it provides a
larger quantity of public goods than region H and has a smaller marginal rate of
substitution. It is assumed henceforward that the transfer is not so large as to
generate this reversal of fortunes, and under this assumption, the adjustments to
the model necessitated by equalization payments are quite small. Neither region
is able to provide the optimal quantity of public goods, so the lump-sum transfer
to the agents continues to be zero. Maximal utility is therefore
V (si;￿;￿i;￿i) ￿ u( b X(si;￿;￿i); b R(si;￿;￿i;￿i))
and the marginal rate of substitution is
￿(si;￿;￿i;￿i) ￿ MRS( b X(si;￿;￿i); b R(si;￿;￿i;￿i))
The properties of equilibrium are essentially unchanged.
An equilibrium triplet (￿;sH;sL) satis￿es (12) and the ￿rst-order conditions
V1(si;￿;￿i;￿i) = 0 i = H;L (19)
15To discover the e⁄ects of an increase in ￿L, let s￿
i(￿;￿i;￿i) satisfy (19). The signs
































The positive sign of this derivative implies that, a balanced-budget increase in
￿L shifts both of the curves in Figure 1 to the left.7 Some ￿rms shift from the
high productivity region to the low productivity region, increasing total output
Y:8 There is an accompanying change in net pro￿ts. Its sign is indeterminate, but
bounds can be placed on its magnitude













If the objective of equalization payments is to equalize access to public goods,
they are successful.
Proposition 7. A balanced-budget increase in ￿L increases government revenue
in the low productivity region and decreases it in the high productivity region.
The gap between ￿ and 1 is the distortion associated with this tax regime.
The value of another unit of public goods measured in private goods is ￿, while
the cost of another unit of public goods measured in private goods is only 1. The
gap is therefore the net gain from provided another unit of public goods, again
measured in private goods. Equalization payments tend to equalize the distortion
across the regions.
7An increase in ￿L forces a decrease in ￿H, so that s￿
H decreases. An increase in ￿L increases
s￿
L and therefore decreases 1 ￿ s￿
L:
8Successive increases in ￿L will eventually push so many ￿rms into region L that total output
will begin to decline. However, (17) implies that @Y=@si can only be smaller in region L if ￿i is
smaller in region L, and that possibility has already been assumed away.
16Proposition 8. Assume that ￿H is always equal to ￿￿L. When ￿L is su¢ ciently
near zero, an increase in ￿L causes ￿ to fall in the low productivity region and
rise in the high productivity region.
Furthermore, equalization payments reduce the interregional disparity in util-
ity.
Proposition 9. A balanced-budget increase in ￿L increases the utility of the
agents in the low productivity region and reduces the utility of the agents in the
high productivity region.
Equation (17) continues to hold under unconditional transfers. It shows that
the ￿rms retain all of the gross pro￿ts in a region that optimally provides public
goods; but if the ￿rms retain all of gross pro￿ts, no public goods can be provided.
It follows that unconditional transfers cannot induce a Pareto optimal allocation.
However, transfers coupled with ￿corrective subsidies￿of the sort described by
Wildasin (1989) and DePater and Myers (1994) will sometimes￿ but not always￿
do so.
Suppose that government revenues are





This equation di⁄ers from (18) in that it adds an additional policy parameter ￿i:
A value of ￿i greater than 1 indicates that region i is rewarded (with additional
transfers) for each dollar of revenue that it raises. The central authority can only


















+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
If the economy attains a Pareto optimal allocation, dYi=dsi is the same in both
regions and ￿(si;￿) is equal to 1 in both regions. It follows that ￿i takes the
same value in each region. Letting z be each ￿rm￿ s gross pro￿ts under the Pareto





+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(20)
17Government revenues rise from 0 as ￿ rises from 1. A successful ￿corrective
subsidy￿scheme sets ￿ to raise the desired amount of revenue, and sets ￿H and
￿L to appropriately divide the revenue between the two regions.
Corrective subsidies cannot always induce a Pareto optimal allocation. The
problem is evident from (20). The share of gross pro￿ts retained by the ￿rms
is always greater than 1 ￿ ￿; equivalently, the share taken by the government is
always less than ￿: Since gross pro￿ts are a fraction 1￿￿ of output, the fraction of
output that can be allocated to public good provision is always less than ￿(1￿￿):
If the agents have su¢ ciently strong preferences for the public good, a corrective
subsidy scheme simply cannot raise the necessary revenue.
6. Conclusions
A model in which regions bargain with individual ￿rms has been constructed, and
used to analyze equalization payments. A region in which the underprovision of
goods is severe is unwilling to allow ￿rms to retain a large share of their gross
pro￿ts, making ￿rms less willing to locate their. The impact e⁄ect of transferring
revenue to such a region is to reduce the severity of the underprovision, but this
e⁄ect leads to an in￿ ow of ￿rms which have further bene￿cial e⁄ects. The region
from which the revenue was transferred experiences the opposite e⁄ects. Since
non-contingent equalization payments raise the lower utility and reduce the higher
utility: they are not Pareto improving.
A. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. The inequality (11) implies that the residents of region
i are willing to accept at least a one unit reduction in Xi to obtain a one unit
increase in Ri. Suppose that, contrary to property 1, the set of ￿rms for which
￿i(j) exceeds ￿￿i(j) has positive measure. Region i can slightly reduce its o⁄ers
to the ￿rms in this set without losing them, causing Ri to rise by a non-negligible
amount. Since only half of the net pro￿ts of these ￿rms accrues to the residents of
region i, Xi falls by only half of the increase in Ri, implying an increase in utility.
The existence of a utility-improving deviation for region i implies that this pro￿le
is not an equilibrium pro￿le. Now suppose that property 1 holds but property 2
does not. For some ki; assume that the measure of the smaller of the two sets is at
least equal to m > 0. Let A and B be subsets of the ￿rst and second sets, chosen
so that each subset has measure m: Then region i could reduce its o⁄ers to the
18￿rms in set A; since almost all of these ￿rms have matching o⁄ers from the o⁄er
region, almost all of the ￿rms will relocate to the other region. Simultaneously,
the region could raise its o⁄ers to each ￿rm j in set B to ki: Almost all of these
￿rms will relocate to region i: These changes do not a⁄ect the aggregate gross
pro￿ts of the ￿rms in region i, but they do reduce the aggregate net pro￿ts of
these ￿rms, so that Ri rises by
R
A￿i(j)dj ￿ mki =
R
A (￿i(j) ￿ ki)dj > 0
Since the ￿rms that leave region i do not experience a fall in net pro￿ts, while the
￿rms that enter it experience an increase in net pro￿ts, Xi also rises. Since both
Xi and Ri increase, this adjustment is a utility-improving deviation for region i,
implying that the assumed pro￿le is not an equilibrium pro￿le.
Proof of Lemma 3. To show that this condition is su¢ cient, assume that there
is no such alternative (s0
H;s0
L) and consider the e⁄ects of an alteration in region i￿ s
o⁄ers. Reducing the o⁄ers made to some set of ￿rms causes these ￿rms to relocate
to the other region, which is not utility-improving by assumption. Region i could
also improve its o⁄ers to some set of ￿rms. This improvement can be decomposed
into two parts: (i) an arbitrarily small improvement in the o⁄ers to a set of ￿rms
that induces these ￿rms to choose region i over region ￿i, (ii) an improvement to
the o⁄ers of ￿rms that have chosen to locate in region i: Deviations of the ￿rst
type do not raise Ui by assumption. Deviations of the second type simply shift
resources from Xi to Ri, and this shift could also be accomplished by making a
larger transfer in the second stage. Since the second stage transfer is assumed to
be optimal, this deviation does not raise Ui. The impact on utility of a deviation
involving both types of changes is the sum of the impact of the individual changes
and therefore cannot raise utility. To show necessity, assume that there is an
alternative division of the ￿rms satisfying (12) such that Ui is greater. If Ui would
be greater if it had a smaller share of the ￿rms, the region i has a utility-improving
deviation: reducing the o⁄ers to some ￿rms causes them to relocate, so that the
region sheds the unwanted ￿rms. Now suppose that Ui would be greater if it had
a larger share of ￿rms under the current set of o⁄ers. It can obtain the extra
￿rms at an arbitrarily small cost by raising the o⁄ers to some set of ￿rms by
an arbitrarily small amount, and by continuity, this deviation would raise utility.
Thus, equilibrium requires that each region be content with the division of the
￿rms under the equilibrium pro￿le.
Proof of Lemma 4. Each part is proved in turn.
1. If region i has no ￿rms, Xi is positive and Ri is zero. Since the ￿rst unit of
19public goods provision is arbitrarily valuable, and since both b R1(0;￿) and b X1(0;￿)
are in￿nite, region i￿ s welfare initially rises as the number of ￿rms rises from zero.
Thus, the region￿ s optimal share of the ￿rms is not 0.
2. Let the optimal transfer in region i be t￿(si;￿;￿i): Since each region has a
positive share of the ￿rms in any equilibrium, (15) holds in each region. By the
envelope theorem,
V1 = u1jt￿ b X1 + u2jt￿ b R1
Optimal provision implies







Optimal provision in region i implies that the region has no tax revenue and hence
no public goods provision, which is a contradiction. It follows that, contrary to
assumption, public goods are underprovided. The region makes a positive transfer
to the citizens only if public goods are optimally provided, so the optimal lump-
sum transfer is 0.




= (1 ￿ ￿)￿i(si)










Ri = si(mi ￿ ￿)
It has already been shown that sH is greater than sL: If mH is greater than mL,






Then (5) implies that the marginal rate of substitution is smaller in the high





+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(21)
20Here, the assumption that mH is greater than mL implies that the marginal rate of
substitution is higher in the high productivity region. Since the assumption than
mH is greater than mL leads to contradiction, it must be that mL is greater than
mH: Then (21) implies that the marginal rate of substitution is higher in the low
productivity region. Total income is greater in the high productivity region than
in the low productivity region because the high productivity region has both a
larger productivity factor and a larger share of the ￿rms. If the tax revenues of the
high productivity region were no greater than than those of the low productivity
region, it would have the higher marginal rate of substitution. Since it is known
to have the lower marginal rate of substitution, its tax revenues must be greater
than those of the low productivity region. Since the governments transfer no tax
revenue back to the residents, consumption of both goods is higher in the high
productivity region.
























































￿ + ￿4 b R1
￿ ￿ ￿2 b R1
#
i = H;L (23)
Now compare the absolute values of ￿2 and ￿4. Hold si constant, and let a one-
unit increase in ￿ be accompanied by a si-unit increase in ￿i. The increase in ￿
alone would raise ￿ by both decreasing b R and increasing b X: The accompanying
increase in ￿i prevents b R from changing, but has no e⁄ect on b X: That is, a one-unit
increase in ￿ has a greater impact on ￿ than a si-unit increase in ￿i:
￿2 > ￿si￿4
Since b R1 is negative in the neighbourhood of an equilibrium,
￿ + ￿4 b R1
￿ ￿ ￿2 b R1
<
￿ + ￿4 b R1






21Substituting (23) and (24) into (22) gives the required inequality.
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose that RL does not rise when ￿L rises. Inspec-
tion of (18) shows that this outcome can only occur if ￿ rises, but then (13) implies
that XL rises. The changes in XL and RL cause the marginal rate of substitution
to rise in region L: This outcome is inconsistent with (17): the presumed increase
in ￿ pushes up the left-hand side of the equation, while the increases in sL and
￿(sL;￿) push down the right-hand side. This contradiction implies that, contrary
to assumption, RL rises when ￿L rises. A symmetric argument shows that RH
falls when ￿H falls, as required for a balanced budget change.
Proof of Proposition 8. Consider region L: Using (17) to eliminate ￿ from b X

























+ (1 ￿ ￿)
The direct e⁄ect of an increase in ￿L is to reduce this ratio. The increase in ￿L
(accompanied by an equal but opposite change in ￿H) also induces changes in sL
and ￿(sL;￿): It has already been shown that sL rises, and while the rise in sL
pushes the numerator and the denominator in the same direction, it unambigu-
ously reduces the ratio when ￿L is su¢ ciently near zero. If ￿(sL;￿) does not fall,
the adjustment in ￿(sL;￿) does not raise the ratio. Then, for ￿L su¢ ciently near
zero, the direct and indirect e⁄ects of an increase in ￿L both push the ratio higher.
By (5), this change and the observation that b R rises with ￿L, imply that ￿(sL;￿)
falls. Since this ￿nding contradicts the premise that ￿(sL;￿) does not fall, the
premise must be false: the increase in ￿L must be accompanied by a decrease in
￿(sL;￿): A symmetric argument shows that the budget-balancing adjustment in
￿H reduces ￿(sH;￿):
Proof of Proposition 9. By the envelope theorem, the e⁄ect of a balanced-















The sign of u1￿2s￿
Lu2 is uncertain because ￿ ￿ u2=u1 is greater than 1 and region
L contains less than half of the ￿rms. Suppose that u1 ￿ 2s￿
Lu2 is negative. If




















Now suppose that u1￿2s￿
Lu2 is positive. If d￿=d￿L is positive, dV=d￿L is positive.



















which is also positive. Similarly, the e⁄ect of a balanced-budget increase in ￿L on















where u1￿2s￿u2 is negative (￿ is greater than 1 and region H contains more than
















which is also negative.￿ 633.
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